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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AN OVERVIEW - THE DEFINITIONS OF THE ISSUES
Two outstanding technical issues in controlling accesses to databases of a secure
database system are articulated in this thesis and a solution is proposed Although these
two issues are motivated and characterized separately, the solution to one of the two
issues appears to also be the solution to the other.
The first issue is access precision. Access precision is defined as the ratio of the
amount of accessed data that satisfies a user's query versus the amount of data that have
been retrieved from secondary storage and placed in the main memory in response to that
query.
Ideally, the amount of accessed data satisfying a query should be equal to the
amount of data retrieved by the database system. In this ideal situation, the access
precision of the database system is said to be absolute. Absolute precision in access
control of a database system is indicative of great control and high performance, where
every piece of data retrieved in response to the query is authorized for release. To
implement access control, conventional secure database systems use either the view
mechanism or the query modification, or a combination of the two. Unfortunately,
neither the view mechanism nor query modification can achieve absolute precision, since
they are both filtering mechanisms.
The second issue is pass-through. When classified data with different classifications
are stored in a database, it is necessary for a contemporary database system to pass
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through other classified data in order to find the properly classified data. Although the
user of the classified data will receive from the system the properly classified data, the
database system has breached the security by bringing the other classified data into the
main memory from the secondary storage. Ideally, a database system should not breach
the security by bringing out unauthorized (or otherwise unwanted) data from the
secondary storage but, instead, bring in only authorized (i.e., properly classified) data
into the main memory. Database systems that do not suffer from the pass-through
problem can survive crashes of the system software and hardware without releasing
unauthorized data to the user. It is clear also that systems with the pass-through problem
do not operate with absolute access precision either, so efficiency also suffers.
B. THE METHODOLOGY USED
The proposed solution to the access precision and pass-through issues uses a
database counterpart to the mathematical notion of equivalence relations. In
mathematics, an equivalence relation of sample data effectively partitions the sample
data into mutually exclusive subsets of data. In the database system environment,
equivalence relations will be identified based on attribute values and attribute-value
ranges so that the database can be partitioned into mutually exclusive compartments.
These attributes are the security attributes.
These secured compartments are collections of records where each compartment of
records has the same aggregate of security attributes. Further, no two compartments have
a common record with the same aggregate of security attributes. By referring to security
attributes in parsing the attributes of predicates of a user query, the database system can
decide a priori the needed compartments of records which satisfy the query. In this way,
only records in the proper compartments are accessed. Records in other compartments
will not be passed through. This mode of access to the compartmentalized database via
security attributes eliminates the pass-through problem.
The concepts of equivalence relation and secured compartments may also be
employed for the improvement of access precision. By defining an equivalence relation
of non-security attributes in terms of their attribute values and attribute-value ranges, we
can effectively partition the database into clusters of records such that records of a cluster
are characterized by the same set of attribute values and attribute-value ranges. Further,
no two clusters contain a common record with the same set of attribute values and
attribute value ranges. The equivalence relation and cluster assignments are defined in
the meta data of the database. The records belonging to these clusters constitute the base
data of the database.
After review of current data models, D. K. Hsiao's Attribute-Based Data Model [1]
(ABDM) was chosen due to its use of the meta-data organization which defines the
clusters (equivalence classes). In the ABDM (see Chapter IV for details), a user's query
is first processed against the meta data. Attribute values and attribute-value ranges of the
meta-data which appear in the user's query are then identified. A Cartesian product of
these values and ranges is performed next, resulting in one or more sets of attribute
values and attribute-value ranges. These sets are compared with the Cartesian product of
the members of the meta data. If a set is a subset of a member, then the cluster defined by
the member must have the records satisfying the user's query. Consequendy, accesses are
made directly to those and only those clusters of the base data whose defining Cartesian-
product members contain the sets of attribute values and attribute-value ranges
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determined by the query. Accesses to the e clusters of the dase data are direct with no
passing through other clusters of the base data.
This thesis uses the ABDM to demonstrate how the notion of equivalence classes
and security attributes can be combined to develop a database system that can achieve
very high access precision and also eliminate the pass-through problem. For perhaps the
first time, the incorporation of better access control to a database system does not incur
overhead in terms of inprecision and also improves the access precision as well. In fact,
the new security mechanism will facilitate high performance and better control
objectives.
C. SUPPORTING WORK
Characterization and identification of the pass-through and access precision
problems is due to D. K. Hsiao [2], who also outlined the security atom concept which is
the fundamental basis of the security methodology outlined in this paper. Work by E.
Wong and T. C. Chiang [3] also provided the basis for some of the work.
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H. DATABASE SECURITY
Information is a precious commodity in the modern world. Many organizations, even
though they might not realize its preciousness, have assigned values to their information.
In essence, the data maintained is analogous to a currency, and the computer and storage
devices form a bank.
The Department of Defense assigns classifications to all of its documents, and has
defined the value of each type of data depending on its classification level. This value is
used to estimate the damage to the United States if this material is compromised. For
example, the compromise of one classification results in serious danger to the security of
the country while the compromise of a higher classification can result in grave danger.
The objective of database security is to effectively protect information maintained in
a database. This protection of information is against unauthorized disclosure, alteration,
or destruction [4].
A. SECURITY THREATS
The possible security threats to a computer system are too numerous to list here but
it appears worthwhile to outline some of the major threats [4], These include physical
threats which are relatively easy to protect against such as the theft of the storage
medium, line tapping, and cross talk from a secure line to an unsecure line.
Other threats which are more difficult to protect against include undetected hardware
failures; failure of systems software protection mechanisms; incorrect specification of
12
security policy by the security administrator, malicious and non-malicious disabling of
security mechanisms by a systems programmer; and fraudulent identification by a user.
Even more insidious threats exist such as a Trap Door, which is defined by the DoD
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [5] (the "Orange book") as "a hidden
software or hardware mechanism that permits system protection mechanisms to be
circumvented. It is activated in some non-apparent manner (e.g., a special "random" key
sequence at a terminal)." Another threat, Trojan Horse, "is a computer program with an
apparently or actually useful function that contains additional (hidden) functions that
surreptitiously exploit the legitimate authorizations of the invoking process to the
detriment of security. For example, making a 'blind copy' of a sensitive file for the
creator of the Trojan Horse." [5]
1. Special Characteristics of Database Security
There are also many special threats to the security of a database, some of which
are applicable because of the special nature of databases. Some of the work on the
security of databases have grown out of the work on secure operating systems. The basis
for many of the security models in operating systems is that an access rule specifies the
types of access a subject can have for an object. In the context of a database, the subject
is often the user and the object is the data which is being accessed. The special
characteristics of a database which differentiate its security requirements from an
operating system include [4]:
- There are more objects to be protected in a database.
- The lifetime during which data is used normally is longer in a database.
- Database security is concerned with differing levels of granularity, such as a file,
record type, field type, and field occurrence.
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- Operating systems are concerned with the protections of physical resources. In
database systems the objects can be complex logical structures, a number of which
can map to the same physical data objects.
- There are different security requirements for the different database-system
architectural levels: internal to the system, conceptual to the user, and external to
the transaction.
- Database security is concerned with the semantics of data, not just its physical
characteristics.
2. Special Threats to a Database System
Two major types of data are threatened in a database system: meta data, which
is information about the database, and base data, which consists of the records of the
database itself.
a. Direct Disclosure of Data
This includes disclosure by the database system itself or by the individual.
This paper is concerned with inadvertant disclosure of data by the system, not the
individual. Such faulty disclosures are often termed spillage.
b. Modification/destruction of Data
There are additional threats other than inadvertant disclosure. A malicious
user can do severe damage to a database by modifying or destroying data. There have
also been documented events where computer "viruses" entered major computer systems
via modem and destroyed major files.
c. Inference
Inference in database systems is a very difficult problem to solve. In
general, an inference attack occurs when a user infers unauthorized data from other
knowledge he has obtained from the system legally or which he already holds. These
include both semantic and statistical inferences. Much of the current work to solve
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inference problems uses rule-based AI techniques [6].
d. Aggregation
Aggregation threats are deductions of sensitive information using the
overall impression given by a data aggregate. It follows that aggregation threats are the
opposite of inference threats.
e. Trojan Horse
In the case of database systems, a Trojan Horse can refer to a transaction
which lies hidden within another transaction. When the later transaction is being
executed, the hidden transaction then attacks the database and breaches its security.
B. COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures are methods of protecting the data in a database. The three major
methods are: access controls, inference controls, and backup-and-recovery
procedures [7]. The first two methods are active protection and the latter passive. This
thesis is only concerned with the access control issue.
1. Access Controls
Access is defined in [5] as "a specific type of interaction between a subject and
an object that results in the flow of information from one to the other." At this point more
precise definitions of subject and object are required. By the same reference, subject is
"an active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device that causes
information to flow among objects or changes the system state." An object is "a passive
entity that contains or receives information." An access to an object potentially implies
an access to the information it contains. Examples of objects are: records, blocks, pages,
segments, files, directories, and programs, as well as bits, bytes, words, fields, processors,
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video displays, keyboards, clocks, etc.
Access controls involve in the assignment of users rights and privileges for the
purpose of controlling access to the database.
2. View Mechanisms and Query Modifications
The view mechanism defines a view, or subset of attributes, on a relation (file) in
a relational (non-relational) database system. The user is restricted from accessing those
attribute values of the relations (files) whose attributes are not in the view. Views serve to
filter out the sensitive data.
In the query modification mechanism, a user's query is modified according to
the user's data access rights by appending a permit or deny clause as a conjunction to the
original query. The combined query is then submitted to the query processor of the
database system as the query of the user. In effect, the user is restricted to the logical
intersection of the original query and the added restricting clause.
The effects of both methods are to control the data accessed. However, in the
case of the view mechanism, access precision is very poor because extra data must be
brought into the main memory for filtering, and query modification, although access
precision is good, tends to be inefficient because the system must perform additional
query processing, i.e., processing both the user query and security clause.
C. MULTILEVEL SECURITY
A multilevel secure system is defined by [5] as "a class of system containing
information with different sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with
different security clearances and needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access
to information for which they lack authorization."
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The security methodology outlined herein is designed to be used in the design and
implementation of a multilevel secure database. Such a database would allow users with
different access rights to use the same database and ensure through security protection
that data rights would be given only in accordance with the rights of the user.
Such a database would be characterized by efficiency in storage, since there would
not have to be physical partitioning by classification (e.g., separate disk packs for each
aggregate of security attributes), and efficiency in update, since multiple copies of data
would not have to be kept.
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HI. EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS
The concept of an equivalence relation is intrinsic to the understanding of the
security methodology proposed in this thesis. In effect, we will demonstrate a method
using an equivalence relation to partition a set S of records comprising a database into
disjoint, non-empty equivalence classes. Thus, equivalence classes as sets of records will
enable the chosen data model to address each set directly without having to pass through
records in other sets, i.e., other equivalence classes.
A method will be oudined to ensure each equivalence class will correspond to a
different combination of security attributes. For example, a set of records classified as
TOP SECRET would be in one equivalence class, and those which are only SECRET
would be contained in another. Each equivalence relation R that partitions S into these
equivalence classes for security purposes will be a security attribute (it will be shown in
IV that every directory attribute in the chosen data model participated in an equivalence
relation).
A. SOME SET THEORETICAL NOTIONS
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of a set, a collection of objects
(members of the set) without repetition. Finite sets may be specified by listing their
members between brackets. For example, {2,4} denotes a set consisting of the even
numbers 2 and 4.
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Sets may also be specified:
{ x I P(X ) }
{ x in A I P(x) }
The first notation is read "the set of objects x such that P(x) is true," where P(x) is some
property of or statement about objects x. The second reads: "the set of x in set A such
that P(x) is true." [8]
B. RELATIONS AND EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS
A (binary) relation is a set of pairs. The first component of each pair is chosen from
a set called the domain, and the second component of each pair is chosen from a
(possibly different) set called the range. An alternate definition is that a binary relation,
R, from set A to set B, is a subset of A x B (the cartesian product of sets A and B). If R is
a relation, and (a,b) is a pair in R, then common notation is aRb.
1. Properties of Relations
We say a relation R on set S is:
a. reflexive if aRa for all a in S;
b. irreflexive if aRa is false for all a in S;
c. transitive if aRb and bRc imply aRc;
d. symmetric if aRb implies bRa;
e. asymmetric if aRb implies that bRa is false.
2. Equivalence Relations
A relation R that is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive is said to be an
equivalence relation. An important property of an equivalence relation R on a set S is
19




where for each i and j, where i is not identical to j:
a. Si n Sj = null set;
b. for each a and b in 5,- , aRb is true;
c. for each a in 5,- and b in Sj , aRb is false.
The Si 's are called equivalence classes.
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IV. THE ATTRIBUTE-BASED DATA MODEL
To characterize my access control method, a data model is proposed. This model,
known as the attribute-based data model, developed by D. K. Hsiao [1] and extended by
E. Wong and T. C. Chiang [3], characterizes two kinds of data: base data and meta data.
The base data consists of records and the meta data consists of information about the
base data, i.e., about the records.
A. THE BASE DATA
Logically, a database consists of different files of records. Each file contains a
collection of records which are characterized by a unique set of directory keywords.
Thus, a record is composed of two parts. The first part is a series of attribute-value pairs
or keywords. An attribute-value pair, i.e., keyword, is a member of the Cartesian product
of the attribute set and the value domain of the attribute. As an example, <
POPULATION, 25000 > is an attribute-value pair having 25000 as the value for the
population attribute. A record contains at most one attribute-value pair for each attribute
defined in the database.
Certain attribute-value pairs of a record are called directory keywords of the record,
because either the attribute-value pairs or their attribute-value ranges are kept in a
directory for identifying the records. Those attribute-value pairs which are not kept in
the directory are called non-directory keywords. The rest of the record is the textual data,
which is referred to as the record body.
21
An example of a record with three keywords and a record body is shown below.
(< Category, US City Description >, < City, Monterey >,
< Population, 25000 >, {The city of Monterey was
founded in ... })
The angle brackets, <,>, enclose an attribute-value pair, i.e., keyword. The curly
brackets, {,}, include the record body. The first attribute-value pair of all records of a
file, by convention, is the same. In particular, the attribute is CATEGORY and the value
is the category name (CATEGORY is equivalent in concept to a logical file). A record is
enclosed in the parenthesis. For example, the above sample record is from the
USCityDescription category. The use of brackets and parentheses is for presenting a
record in a linear form without due consideration of its physical format. With a linear
form, we can refer to individual records directly and easily.
It is also important to note that all of the above constructs are well defined in terms
of other constructs. The only two undefined constructs are the attribute set and the value
domain. Intuitively, we know that an attribute is the characteristics of the value. For the
base data, the only rule placed on a record is that no two attributes are identical. This
rule ensures that in a record all of the attribute-value pairs are single-valued and that
there are no redundant (identical) attribute-value pairs. For example, the following
records are not allowed:
(<CATEGORY, USCity Description^ <City, Monterey>,
Population, 1000000>, Population, 25000>,
{The city of Monterey was founded
...})
(<CATEGORY, USCityDescription>, <City, Monterey>,
<City, Monterey>, <Population, 25000>,
{The city of Monterey was founded ...})
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The first has two different population figures. Therefore, the population attribute is
not single-valued. The second repeats the city name which results in a redundancy.
The records of the files of a database constitute the base data of the database. In
general, given a record of attribute-value pairs, one cannot distinguish the directory
keywords from the non-directory keywords unless one refers to the meta data which is
discussed in Section C.
B. IDENTIFYING RECORDS
For the user, the records of the database may be identified by utilizing keyword
predicates. A keyword predicate (for brief, predicate) is a 3-tuple consisting of an
attribute, a relational operator (=, >, <, >, <), and an attribute value, e.g., POPULATION
> 20000 is a keyword predicate. More specifically, it is a greater-than predicate.
Combining keyword predicates in disjunctive normal form characterizes a query of the
database. The following query
(CATEGORY= USCityDescription and CITY = Monterey) or
(CATEGORY= USCityDescription and CITY = San Jose)
will be satisfied by all of the records of the USCityDescription category with the CITY of
either Monterey or San Jose. For clarity, parentheses are used for bracketing
conjunctions in a query. Thus, we have the following general format of a query:
(P n and P l2 and ••• andP lni ) or (P 2l and/
>
22 an(1 "" anci ^2n 2) or "'
or (Pml and Pm2 and • • and P^)
In disjunctive normal form, the predicates of a conjunction must not be contradictory.
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For instance, we cannot have (Population > 10000 and Population < 10000) as a
conjunction, since the two predicates contradict each other, resulting in no records whose
population features can be both greater and less than 10000.
For the database system, the records of the database are identified by unique record
ids. These ids are assigned to the records at the time that the records are being entered
into the database. They are unique, since no two records have the same ids. Id
assignment for records is a function of the database system. For purposes of explanation,
we simply use arbitrary letters and numerals such as Rl, R2, ... , R100, ... to designate
the record ids.
C. THE METADATA
The meta data is stored information about the base data. Collectively, the various
meta-data constructs form the directory of the database. The directory has the following
constructs: attributes, descriptors, and clusters. An attribute is used to represent a
certain common property of the base data as defined before, e. g., POPULATION is an
attribute that corresponds to actual population features in the database. A descriptor is
used to describe a range of values that an attribute can have. For example (10001 <
POPULATION < 15000) is a possible descriptor for the attribute POPULATION. The
descriptors that are defined for an attribute, e.g., population ranges, are mutually
exclusive in terms of their values. Now the notion of a cluster can be defined. A cluster
is a collection of records such that every record in the cluster satisfies the same set of
descriptors. For example, all records with POPULATION between 10001 and 15000
may form one cluster whose descriptor is the one given above. In this case, the cluster
satisfies the set of a single descriptor. In reality, a cluster tends to satisfy a set of multiple
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descriptors. For the meta data, the only rule we place on a record is that a record must
have at least one directory attribute. The attributes of the records that appear in the
directory are directory attributes.
The condition that the descriptors defined for a given attribute have mutually
exclusive attribute values is a necessary and important one. Mathematically, the
descriptors of the attribute serve to derive equivalence classes which effectively partition
the database into mutually exclusive sets of records. These record sets are, of course,
termed clusters here. Thus, database clusters, equivalence classes and database partitions
in this context are synonymous.
The sizes of the clusters are not uniform. Some clusters may have several records;
other clusters may have only a few; while still other clusters may not have any. To keep
track of the directory attributes for which descriptors are formed, we utilize an attribute
table. For all of the descriptor sets that effectively partition the database into clusters, we
maintain a descriptor-set table. Finally, to know which records belong to which clusters,
we use a cluster table. More specifically, the directory is organized in three tables: the
attribute table (AT), the descriptor-to-descriptor-id table (DDIT) and the cluster-
definition table (CDT), examples of which are given in Figure 4.1. AT maps directory
attributes to the descriptors defined on them. A sample AT is depicted in Figure 4.1 (a).
DDIT maps each descriptor to a unique descriptor id. A sample DDIT is given in Figure
4.1 (b). CDT maps descriptor-id sets to cluster ids. Each entry consists of a unique
cluster id, a set of descriptor ids whose descriptors define the cluster, and ids of the
records that are in the cluster. A sample CDT is shown in Figure 4.1 (c).
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We have a number of observations in reviewing the sample tables. Our first
observation is that AT is too small. In reality, any sizable database may have hundreds,
if not thousands, of attributes in the database. For our illustration, we simply use three.




(a) An Attribute Table (AT).
Id Descriptor
Dll < POPULATION <> 50000
D12 50001 < POPULATION < 100000
D13 100001 < POPULATION < 250000
D14 250001 < POPULATION < 1000000
D21 CITY = Cumberland
D22 CITY = Columbus
D23 CITY = Monterey
D24 CITY = Toronto
D31 CATEGORY = CanadaCityDescription
D32 CATEGORY = USCityDescription
Dij: Descriptor j for attribute i.
(b) A Descriptor-to-Descriptor-Id Table (DDIT).





(c) A Cluster-Definition Table (CDT).
Figure 4.1 The Directory Tables
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Our next observation is that there are different kinds of descriptors in DDIT,
descriptors that deal with attribute-value ranges and descriptors that deal with distinct
attribute values. More specifically, there are three classifications of descriptors. A type-
A descriptor is a conjunction of less-than-or-equal-to predicate and a greater-than-or-
equal-to predicate, such that the same attribute appears in both predicates. For example,
((POPULATION > 50001) and (POPULATION < 100000)) is a type-A descriptor. A
type-B descriptor consists of only an equality predicate. (CATEGORY =
USCityDescription) is an example of type-B descriptor. Finally, a type-C descriptor
consists of the name of an attribute only. The type-C attribute defines a set of type-C
sub-descriptors. Type-C sub-descriptors are equality predicates defined over all unique
attribute values which exist in the database. For this reason, the type-C sub-descriptor
are also of type-B. For example, the type-C attribute CITY forms the type-C sub-
descriptors (CITY=Cumberland), (CITY=Columbus), (CITY=Monterey) and
(CITY=Toronto), where "Cumberland", "Columbus", "Monterey", and "Toronto" are the
only unique database values for the CITY in the base data. Unlike type-B descriptors,
type-C descriptors are on-demand or dynamic descriptors. If for a type-C attribute, a
type-C subdescriptor for a particular attribute value is not available in DDIT, a new
type-C subdescriptor is automatically generated and inserted into DDIT. Hence, we have
the notion of on-demand or dynamically available type-C subdescriptors. We note that
we include the descriptor type in AT, as seen by the column titled Attribute Type in
Figure 4.1 (a).
In reality, DDIT tends to be large, in fact, much larger than AT. It constitutes the
bulk of the directory. The use of type-C descriptors tends to increase the size of DDIT
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(and, therefore, the directory) enormously. On the other hand, type-A descriptors tend to
conserve the directory space, since they do not use distinct values (such as social security
numbers). Instead, they use value ranges. As long as there are reasonably small number
of ranges, the number of type-A descriptors for a given attribute can be small.
We also observe that each descriptor, no matter what type, can partition the database
into two parts - with a record of the database belonging in one partition but not in the
other partition. As we introduce an additional descriptor for the same attribute, one of the
partitions is further divided into two. Thus, for a given attribute the number of resulting
partitions is linearly proportional to the number of descriptors introduced. For example,
in referring to Figure 4. 1 (b), if there was only one descriptor (0 < POPULATIONS <
50000) in DDIT, then the database records would be partioned into two sets of records
whose population is in the range and whose population is not in the range. Should we
introduce an additional descriptor (50001 < POPULATION < 100000), then the records
would be partitioned into three sets of records - those whose population is under 50001,
those whose population is in the range of 50001 and 100000, and those whose population
is beyond 100000. Clearly, the number of record sets (partitions) is one greater than the
the descriptors on POPULATION used. This is linear in proportion.
When two or more attributes are utilized in the descriptors, the number of record sets
(partitions) is proportional to the product of the total number of descriptors for each of
the different directory attributes. For example, in referring to Figure 4.1 (b) again, we
have the following statistics:
The number of descriptors of the attribute POPULATION is 4;
The number of descriptors of the attribute CITY is 4;
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The number of descriptors of the attribute CATEGORY is 2.
Thus, the maximal number of partitions is a product of 4, 4 and 2, i.e., 32, since
32=4x4x2. In other words, there could be 32 mutually exclusive sets of records in the
database. In fact, we can characterize these record sets using the descriptors that have
defined them. Mathematically, we are forming the Cartesian product of Di where Di is
the set of descriptors for attribute i. Let
Di = [Dil, Di2, ..., Di/,- J
where there are ji descriptors of attribute i. The Cartesian product DlxD2x ... xDi has
the following members:
{ {DI 1, D21, ..., Dil }, {D12, D22 Di2}, ..., (Dlj lf D2j2 , ..., Dij, } }.
We require that the descriptors used in DDIT have the covering property. The
covering property states that (1) for the type-A descriptors of an attribute, all of the
possible attribute values in the database for the attribute are covered by the attribute-
value ranges of the descriptors and (2) for the type-B (or type-C) descriptors of an
attribute, all of the possible attribute values in the database for the attribute appear in the
type-B (or type-C) descriptors. Thus, each descriptor set defines a cluster of records.
Specifically, there are potentially J clusters, where
J = j l xj 2 x...xji
It is important to note that although the potential number of clusters is 32 in this
example, the CDT keeps track of only four of the 32 clusters. Thus, the CDT only keeps
track of those clusters that contain records. As new records are being entered into the
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database, existing clusters may contain more records and new clusters may be formed.
The cluster size is reflected by the number of record ids kept in the CDT. The new
clusters are reflected by the new entries in the CDT.
Although individual clusters may have different sizes, the average size of the cluster
tends to become smaller, i.e., fewer records, as the number of descriptors which
characterize the clusters increase. There are two factors in the increase of the number of
descriptors. One factor is that there are more descriptors for a given attribute, i.e., there
are more Dij for a given i. The other factor is that there are more attributes as well, i.e., i
is a large number.
D. THE RETRIEVE OPERATION
To search for records in the database, the user specifies a search request. The
request has the following form:
RETRIEVE (query) [target-list] [by-clause]
where the literal indicates the name of the operation, parentheses enclose the mandatory
qualification and brackets enclose the optional qualifications. A sample search request is
given in Section D.2.
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1. The Six Execution Steps
Step 1: Processing the Query against the Attribute Table.
The query in the search request is in a disjunctive normal form:
(/V/V - "^i)iv( h v •• v( ),.
We note that each P
t
is a predicate. The predicate may either be an equality predicate
with a unique attribute value, e.g., (City = Monterey); or a predicate with attribute-value
ranges, i.e., (5001 < Population < 10000). In particular, there are r
:
predicates in the first
conjunction and s conjunctions in the query.
Let r
i
be the number of predicates in the i-th conjunction, then there are r
number of predicates in the query where
It follows that there are at most r different attributes, since each predicate contains an
attribute.
The processing of the query against the attribute table (AT) is to determine
which of the r attributes in the query are in the AT. Those that do not appear in AT are
non-directory attributes. Only directory attributes are utilized in this step. Non-directory
attributes and their predicates are utilized in a later step.
Assuming that t attributes are found in AT, we then have s conjunctions in the
query, t directory attributes, and (r-t) non-directory attributes in the query. These t
directory attributes found in AT play an important role in the next step of meta data
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processing. They form the directory-attribute list of the query. This first step is termed
the attribute-determination step.
Step 2: Processing the Directory Attributes against the Descriptor-to-Descriptor-Id
Table.
Once the directory attributes for the query are found in AT, we can then use the
directory-attribute list of the query to locate the descriptors in DDIT whose attributes are
identical to the attributes on the list Locating descriptors in DDIT is a rather simple
task. For a given attribute, Ai, a descriptor j for the attribute has the id Dij. As an id
number, Dij is either identical to the number Dil or follow the number Dil. We note that
Dil is placed in AT along with Ai. Thus, the search involves the following algorithm,
implemented for each conjunction in the query:
(1) Pick an attribute Ai from the directory-attribute list appearing in
the conjunction.
(2) Use Ai's id number, e.g., Dil in AT, to access the DDIT entry.
(3) Does value in DDIT meet requirements of predicate?
(4) If yes, then we have found a descriptor. We then record its
corresponding descriptor id, Dij.
Repeat (3) and (4) for the next DDIT entry. Since there are only a finite number of
entries for the descriptors of the same attribute, the repetition will eventually be
terminated. These steps are then repeated until each attribute appearing in the
conjunction has been defined.
At this point, for the attribute Ai, there are k
t
descriptors and their id's
determined, i.e., Dil, Di2, . . . , Dik
t
. The set of descriptors identified by Dil, Di2, . . .
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Dikj is called the Ai-descriptor group. Their ids form the Ai-descriptor-id group. There is
an Ai-descriptor(-id) group for each attribute Ai in the attribute list. If there has been a
directory-attribute list of t attributes from Step 1, there are now t Ai-descriptor groups
one for each i. In addition, there are t Ai-descriptor-id groups. Thus, for each Ai, there
are two sets: the Ai-descriptor group and the Ai-descriptor-id group. For example, if A
1
is the attribute POPULATION and the descriptor is (50001 < POPULATION < 100000),
then the A rdescriptor group is {(50001 < POPULATION < 100000)} and the Al-
descriptor-id group is {D12}. This example is based on the meta data of AT and DDIT
in Figure 4.1. We note these groups are singletons, i.e., sets of only single elements. In
practice, they are not restricted to singletons. However, the groups are by nature small,




The rest of this step is to form the Cartesian product of the Ai-descriptor-id
groups fori = 1, . . ., t,
D
1
xD 2 x...x£> r .
Step 3: Determining the Cluster Ids.
With the given descriptor-id groups from step 2, it is an easy task to determine
the corresponding cluster ids by searching CDT. The search is a simple comparison of
each given descriptor-id group with the descriptor-id sets in CDT. If there is a match,
then a cluster id is found in CDT for the descriptor-id group. A match means that either
the group is identical to the set or the group is a subset of the set. The time complexity
for this comparison is at worst O(mn) where m is the number of given descriptor-id
groups from step 2 and n is the number of descriptor-id sets in CDT. In practice, m is
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usually a smaller number, even though n may be large. Further, the table search may be
replaced by a B-tree search, since CDT is well suited for the B-tree organization. The
time complexity for the search can be reduced to 0(m log n).
Once all of the cluster ids are found, their clusters are determined. The number
and identification of records that are in the clusters are also determined. This is all done
with CDT. We term this step the cluster determination step.
Step 4: Determining the Record Ids and Addresses
For ;h cluster determined in step 3, there is a corresponding list of one or
more record ids. Record ids uniquely identify the records. In this step, the unique
identifiers are converted into disk addresses for the records. Once converted, disk
accesses commence. Therefore, this step is termed the address-generation-and-record-
access step.
Step 5: Selecting the Records.
After a record is brought into the main memory from the disk storage, the record
is checked against the query. We observe that the previous four steps applied to the
query of the operation have resulted in having these records brought into the main
memory. We might conclude that these records by definition satisfy the query and that
there is no need for further checking of the records against the query. What we have to
be aware of is that a query is of predicates of keywords. If none of the keywords is a
non-directory keywords, then all the keywords in the query are directory keywords.
They are, of course, all used in the previous steps to determine the records.
Consequently, we might conclude that in the case of the all-directory-keyword query, this
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step is superfluous. However, this is not the case due to use of query with attribute-value
ranges. On the other hand, when the user issues a query, the user does not necessarily
know the difference between directory and non-directory keywords. The user-issued
query is likely to consist of non-directory keywords. Non-directory keywords are not a
part of the meta data of the database. They do not appear as attributes, descriptors or
descriptor ids in AT, DDIT and CDT. Consequently, the non-directory keywords have
never assisted the system software in narrowing the search space for records on the disks.
However, non-directory keywords and predicates serve as additional qualifications of the
records. Unless a newly accessed record qualifies the non-directory predicates, the
record is not qualified for the entire query. Records that qualified for both directory and
non-directory predicates are selected for either outputting or optional processing. This
step is therefore called the record selection step.
Step 6: Processing the Records.
The final step, i.e., the sixth step, is the record processing step. Record
processing involves two distinct functions: the value extraction function and the
aggregation function. In the value extraction function, not all of the attribute values of a
record are needed for an operation. The attribute values needed are usually indicated by
the user via the target-list attributes. Thus, with the given target list, the system software
extracts the attribute values for outputting. The aggregation function performs an
aggregate operation such as maximum, minimum, or mean, as indicated in the operation.
When indicated, an aggregate operation is always carried out after the value extraction
operation. In summary, the record processing step consists of two optional phases: value
extraction and aggregate operations.
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2. A Sample Search
We now review the step-by-step processing of a sample search operation.
Consider the example where the search operation is as follows:
RETRIEVE ((CATEGORY = USCityDescription) and (20000 < POPULATION < 90000)
and (REGION = West Coast)) (CITY).
This search request will receive all of the names of the U.S. cities that are in the west
coast region and have a population between 20,000 and 90,000 per city. We note that the
query of the operation consists of a conjunction of three predicates - two equality
predicates and one combined less-than-and-greater-than predicate. The target list has the
attribute CITY. In referring to our often used AT in Figure 4.1, we discover in Step 1,
CATEGORY and POPULATION are directory attributes because they have appeared in
AT. REGION is not in AT. It is therefore a non-directory attribute. The implication is
that the non-directory attributes are a part of the records. They may be used in the form
of predicates of the query for selecting those records whose non-directory keywords
qualify the predicates.
Our other observation is that in referring to DDIT in Figure 4.1 the two
directory attributes will result in three descriptors (namely,
CATEGORY=USCityDescription, 0<POPULATION<50000,
5000l<POPULATION<100000) and three descriptor ids (i.e., D11,D12 and D32). This
is the result of step 2. Furthermore, in step 2 we form the Cartesian product of two sets—
the CATEGORY-descriptor-id group {D32} and POPULATION-descriptor-id group
{D11,D12}. The product {D11JD12} x {D32} will result in two descriptor groups that
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cover the query: {Dl 1,D32} and {D12,D32}. These are the final products of step 2.
Once the descriptor-id groups are obtained, they are used to match the
descriptor-id sets of CDT in Figure 4.1. We note that there are two such matches:
{D11,D21,D32} and {D12,D23,D32}. Corresponding to these two descriptor-id sets are
their cluster ids, CI and C3, and their record ids, Rl, R2 and R4. In other words, there
are three records from two clusters that may qualify for the query. This is the result of
step 3.
In step 4, the record ids (Rl, R2 and R4) are transformed into the disk addresses
of the records. This transformation is done by a built-in algorithm. Three records are
retrieved from the secondary storage and placed in the buffers of the main memory. Let
us look at them. They are depicted as follows:
(<CATEGORY, USCityDe scription>, <CITY, Cumberland>, POPULATION,
15000>, <REGION, West Coast>, {The City of Cumberland was founded in . .
• })
(<CATEGORY, USCityDescription>, <CrTY, Cumberland>, POPULATION,
25000>, <REGION, East Coast>, {The City of Cumberland was founded in . . . })
(<CATEGORY, USCityDescription>, <CITY, Monterey>, POPULATION,
65000>, <REGION, West Coast>, {The City of Monterey was founded in . . . })
Of course, the first two satisfy the descriptor set of {(CATEGORY, USCityDescription),
(CITY Cumberland), (0<POPULATION<50000) } . The third satisfies the descriptor set
of {(CATEGORY, USCityDescription), (CITY = Monterey), (50001 < POPULATION <
100000)}. However, all three must be checked against the query. The first does not
satisfy the query, since the population figure in the record does not fall into the
population range of the query. Consequently, this record is not selected for processing.
In the second, the three directory keywords all meet the qualification of the query.
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Unfortunately, the non-directory keyword does not. The query requires the west coast
region whereas the record is of the east coast region. Thus, the second record is
disqualified. It is not selected for further record processing. Finally, the third is checked
against the query. Both the directory and non-directory keywords qualify for the query.
The record therefore satisfies the query. Consequently, this is the only record to be
produced at the end of step 5.
In step 6, we process the record for value extractions and aggregation
operations. Since no aggregation operations are specified for this operation, the only
processing required is the target-list handling (i.e., the value extraction). CITY has been
specified as the only attribute on the target list. The attribute value of the record for the
attribute CITY is therefore extracted from the record and outputted. On the basis of the
sample operation and sample records, the net output of this entire exercise of six steps is
the simple string value, Monterey.
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V. THE METHODOLOGY
As discussed in Chapter IV, one of the requirements of ABDM is that the descriptors
defined for a given attribute have the covering property and that they have mutually
exclusive attribute values. Further, we established that the CDT is a table of equivalence
classes, each of which is disjoint and the union of which (all the records in the CDT)
forms the complete database. The relation R defined over all clusters in the database is:
each record in a cluster has the same set ofdirectory attribute descriptors.
From this, it is clear a database can be partitioned into mutually exclusive sets based
upon security classification if one or more security attributes are inserted into each
record of the database and treated as directory attributes by ABDM.
Id Desc-Id Set Rec-Id.
CI {D11,D21,D31,TS} R1,R2
Id Desc-Id Set Rec-Id.
C2 {D11,D21,D31,S} R3
C3 {D12,D22£>32,S} R5
Id Desc-Id Set Red-Id.
C4 {D12,D22,D32,C} R4
Figure 5.1 A Set of Cluster-Definition Tables (CDT)
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A. DISCUSSION AND A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
In Chapter IV, only one CDT was used for the database. For the security
methodology, we will have a separate CDT for each different combination of security
attributes. There will be additional discussion of this later in the chapter. Assume Figure
5.1 is the set of CDTs resulting from the creation of a database using the AT and DDIT
tables provided in Figure 4.1. TS stands for TOP SECRET; S stands for SECRET; and C
for CONFIDENTIAL (U would stand for UNCLASSIFIED).
The letters stand for security attributes but these are not listed in the AT and
DDIT. The reason for this will also be explained later.
Looking at the CDT, cluster CI has population less-than-or-equal-to 50,000,
Cumberland is the city, it is a CanadaCityDescription category (file), and the
classification is TOP SECRET. C2 has all the same directory keywords except for the
classification attribute. C2 is a cluster of SECRET records.
More specifically, the highest classification of data in the cluster CI (containing
records Rl and R2) is TOP SECRET and the highest classification of data in record R3 is
SECRET.
RULE 1: Every record in the database must contain all the
security attributes used by the system and a value for each
attribute. In many instances, this value will indicate the
presence or absence of a special restriction (e.g., codeword).
For example:
(< Category, US City Description >, < City, Monterey >,
< Population, 25000 >, Classification, SECRET >)
The above would be a valid record in the database. If the database contained
additional security attributes these would also have to be included (examples will be
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given in Chapter VI). Rule 1 ensures the database is effectively partioned into disjoint
clusters of records with the same set of security attributes. If one or more security
attributes were absent from a record, that record could be assigned to more than one
cluster.
For example, if C2 did not have a security attribute for classification, R3 could be
in CI and C2 concurrently and the sets defined by the clusters are no longer disjoint. In
Chapter VI an example will be provided using more than one security attribute:
classification and codeword. Again, if a record only had a value for the classification and
not codeword it could be assigned to two clusters. If the classification were SECRET, the
record could be assigned to the SECRET with-no-codeword cluster and the SECRET
with-codeword cluster at the same time.
RULE 2: Every security attribute in the database must
have the covering property.
The covering property for security attributes states that all possible security
attribute values are known by the system and describe the value of that attribute for any
record in the database. For example, the security attribute classification has only four
values (as defined for our database): TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and
UNCLASSIFIED. Each record in the base-data must be able to be described by one of
those classifications
Again, this covering property is required for all directory keywords in ABDM to
ensure the database is partitioned into disjoint sets, i.e., to maintain the characteristics of
equivalence classes.
RULE 3: The descriptors for a given security attribute must have
mutually exclusive attribute values.
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This is again the same rule that applies to ABDM, and is necessary to support
nartitioning. The classification value TOP SECRET can not overlap in any way with the
value SECRET. A record is either one or the other (here of course we are describing the
highest classification and not access rights).
Given that we are satisfied the database is divided into disjoint compartments, the
remaining issues concern controlling access to the CDT and in effecting the original
partioning.
This follows since we know that, e.g., C2 (record 3) does not contain data at a
higher classification than SECRET. If we can ensure that only persons with a minimum
of a SECRET clearance accesses C2, then we have successfully controlled the access.
Note that at this point I am only discussing the issue of read access.
Some assumptions:
- A user with a TOP SECRET clearance should be able to read all records that have
classification attribute values of: UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET,
and TOP SECRET. However, a user with a SECRET clearance should only be able
to read at SECRET and below. More specifically, a user should be able to read all
records for which his access is equivalent to or dominates.
- In order to prevent the pass-through and access precision problems with the meta-
data, the clusters in a CDT referring to records the user can not access should not be
brought into main memory.
- Our model assumes we have a trusted operating system acting as the guard for entry
into the computer system and for restricting secondary storage retrieval requests.
The procedure is as follows: When the user logs in, the system checks the
password. We will assume the password is associated with the highest classification that
user is allowed to access. At that time, the system will bring in from secondary storage
the corresponding CDT(s).
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Referring to Figure 5.1, if a user with a SECRET clearance logged onto the
system, two CDT tables would be brought into main memory. The SECRET CDT table
would contain entries for C2 and C3, and the CONFIDENTIAL CDT table would contain
C4 (an UNCLASSIFIED CDT table would be brought in for all users). The maintenance
of these tables is done by the database system and security administrator.
There will potentially be a separate CDT table for every possible combination of
security attributes. For example, if in fact we did have a codeword attribute, the SECRET
CDT would be divided into two separate CDTs: one with the codeword and one without
(if each had records). Therefore, when the user logged on to the system and did not have
a codeword clearance the system would only access the CDT(s) without the codeword.
This of course implies that the "guard" to our system recognizes this difference but this is
assumed.
RULE 4: A separate CDT is maintained for each different set of
security attribute descriptors.
After this is done, each query from the user can be processed exactly as ABDM does
normally. If the query matches a descriptor id set that the user is not cleared for it will
not be accessed because the set does not appear in his CDT and only the CDTs the user is
cleared for will be searched. Chapter VI provides a detailed example of this access
control method.
This methodology supports two additional, optional safeguard checks to ensure
the system has formed the CDT correctly. At this stage before the record retrieval there
can be another verification that the clearance level of the user is greater-than or equal-to
the classification attribute contained in the descriptor id set. The second check can be
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performed after the record is brought into main memory before release to the user. The
clearance level can again be compared to classification attribute in much the same way
that a non-directory keyword is checked by ABDM.
The format of the RETRIEVE command is not changed from the command in the
original ABDM as described in Section IV. The system is tasked with bringing in all the
CDT tables which contain clusters of records that the user is cleared to see. Therefore,
security attribute does not need to be specified since all records which satisfy the
directory attributes in the query will be provided to the user. These records may in fact
span different classifications.
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL METHODOLOGY
To recap the methodology to this point:
- AT and DDIT remain the same for all users. Security attributes do not appear in the
AT or DDIT. There is no need to do otherwise and both security and efficiency is
supported (the user should not have access to tables that provide information on
classifications they are restricted from).
- Each security attribute combination has a corresponding separate CDT listing all the
clusters corresponding to that partition or, if there is no such CDT, this means there
are no corresponding records in existence.
- The execution of the RETRIEVE operation would work now as the ABDM does,
with the CDT chosen by the system based upon the clearance level of the user.
- Due to record clustering, only records the user is cleared to see will be brought into
main memory.
C. OTHER ISSUES
Up to this point, we have outlined the fundamental control over database retrieval
requests. ABDM, like other current database management systems, provides capabilities
for records insertion, deletion, modification, and a logical join (RETRIEVE-COMMON
in ABDM). These issues can be resolved through security policy and system design work
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using the fundamental methodology already presented, and these implementation issues
are not the primary thrust of this work. However, it does appear worthwhile to discuss at
least record insertion and modification and outline how they might be handled.
1. Record Insertion
The basic INSERT request is, from the user's standpoint, organized in the
exact manner of a RETRIEVE as described in Chapter IV with the difference being that
the attribute values provided are used to create a new record.
INSERT(<CATEGORY,USCityDescription>, <CITY,Cumberland>,
<POPULATION,40000>)
The above will insert a record into the USCityDescription file for the city
Cumberland with a population of 40000 (no record body is used in this example).
In order to satisfy the requirements for the security methodology, each
record inserted will also require delineation of every security attribute used in the system.
For example, if a basic classification scheme with codeword was used, the system would
ensure the record was of the following format:
INSERT(<FILE,USCensus>, <CrrY,Cumberland>,<POPULATION,40000>,
<CLASSIFICATION,S>, <CODEWORDl,Y>)
This example assumes there are only two security attributes in the system.
If there were more these would also have to be entered to ensure we have the covering
property.
In this example, the classification is SECRET and the material is
codeword. In this case the codeword value is hidden. The association of CODEWORD 1
with the actual codeword used would be given to authorized users.
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INSERT can only enter one record at a time into the database. The
operation can result in significant work for the system, particularly if a type C attribute is
used. However, this issue is one of implementation.
Under the security methodology, the basic system requirements of the
INSERT will remain the same.
a. Step 1
For the example, the system would check to ensure that the user
has the access/clearance necessary to enter the record of the security attributes given. A
user with a SECRET clearance, for example, should not be able to enter TOP SECRET
data.
As in the normal system operation, the non-security attribute-value
pairs (keywords) of the record are identified. For each attribute-value pair, the attribute is
used for matching the attributes in the AT. Locks are placed on the directory attributes
found in the AT.
b. Step 2
With the attribute id's obtained from Step 1, the descriptors in the
DDIT are searched to determine whether a descriptor covers the keyword of the record
having the same attribute and the descriptor-id is used to form the descriptor-id group.
The system must automatically add the security attributes to this descriptor-id group.
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c. Step 3
Now a search is performed for the descriptor-id sets in the CDT(s)
provided to the user based upon the user's access permission. If a descriptor-id set is
found to be identical to the descriptor-id group, then the set is locked with a read/write-
deny lock.
If there is no match, then a new entry is created in the appropriate
CDT assuming that the descriptor-id group has enough descriptor ids to match an
existing set or to create a new set. If the set does not have enough descriptor ids, this
indicates the record lacks one or more directory keywords.
This step reveals more design issues for the security methodology.
If the user is cleared to access SECRET and below codeword material, there will be
separate CDTs for SECRET non-codeword and SECRET codeword clusters. The system
could search through all CDTs looking for a match of the descriptor-id set, which
includes the security attributes, and the access control would still be ensured. However,
such global search is unnecessary since indexing could be used based upon the security
attributes since the security attributes generate different CDTs.
For example, the system could automatically search the CDT
containing SECRET codeword material by using a table lookup method and avoid
searching the SECRET non-codeword CDT.
d. Step 4
The descriptor-id set of CDT which is matched or created is
locked. The record id for the record is created and then placed in the locked entry for the
cluster id in the CDT. The record id is transformed into a disk address and the record is
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placed at the secondary storage at that address. The CDT is modified accordingly.
2. Record Update
The UPDATE operation in ABDM is very similar to the RETRIEVE
operation: all six execution steps of the retrieval operation can be applied to update.
UPDATE((CATEGORY = USCityDescription) and (CITY = Monterey))
(POPULATION = POPULATION + 5000)
The above will modify all records in the file USCityDescription with the
city of Monterey by increasing the population by 5000.
The primary complications concern security policy and record migration.
For security policy, the security administrator (or system designer using
this methodology) must decide who has the authority to change a security attribute. This
is a policy issue that has major ramifications. Should it only be the "owner" of the data
that has the capability or should it only be the security administrator? This paper will not
address such issues since they would be implementation specific.
Record migration occurs in ABDM when a record is reassigned to a
different cluster (or new cluster) as a result of modification. The system as currently
designed handles this migration automatically. If the security policy and system allows




The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the implementation of the
methodology using the sample database of Appendix A.
A. THE META DATA
The following tables constitute the meta-data for this example (all classifications
are entered for example purposes only; all data has been created by author or extracted
from open sources):





(a) Attribute Table (AT).
49
Id Descriptor
Dll < RADIUS < 400
D12 401 < RADIUS < 600
D13 601 < RADIUS < 800
D14 801 < RADIUS < 1000
D15 1001 < RADIUS < 1200
D16 1201 < RADIUS < 2000
D21 PLANE-Type = Fighter
D22 PLANE-Type = Bomber
D23 PLANE-Type = Reconn
D31 COUNTRY = U.S.A.
D32 COUNTRY = U.S.S.R.
D41 FILE = Aircraft
(b) Descriptor-to-Descriptor-Id Table (DDIT).








(c)The TOP SECRET-with-codwordl Cluster-Definition Table (CDT)




(d)The TOP SECRET-without-codewordl CDT
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(e) The SECRET-with-codeword 1 CDT







(0 The SECRET-without-codewordl CDT
Id Desc-Id Set Record-Id.
C17 {D13,D21,D31,D41,C,CW1} R6
(g) The CONFIDENTIAL-with-codeword 1 CDT





(h) The CONFIDENTIAL-without-codeword 1 CDT
Id Desc-Id Set Record-Id.
C20 {D13,D21,D31J341,U,NCW1} R7,R16
(i) The UNCLASSIFIED-without-codeword 1 CDT
Figure 6.1 The Meta-data for Security Example
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B. DISCUSSION
The database used for this example uses Soviet and American fighter aircraft. A
database of this organization might be developed by an organization that is interested in
keeping statistics on aircraft which can be keyed by combat radius in nautical miles (the
attribute RADIUS). Such an organization might be very appropriate to a carrier battle
group operating near a Soviet littoral. The battle group commander could want to know
which fighters have the range to reach his task force. In such a database, the record body
of each record might contain where these fighters are based, etc., and this information
would be classified according to source, sensitivity, and effects of disclosure. CW1
means the record contains codeword 1 and NCW1 means it does not.
1. Database generation
A primary consideration with the security methodology proposed is
database generation. That is, what are the requirements and overhead necessary to effect
the partitioning desired?
This research was conducted in support of Department of Defense (DoD)
security requirements. In DoD, classified data is caveated at a granularity where the
material of different sensitivities is distinguishable when they are presented together in a
document form. That is, in a TOP SECRET document, paragraphs containing only
SECRET material are marked as SECRET within the document. This philosophy also
applies to message traffic, where at a minimum, each paragraph is caveated.
Given this data environment, it is envisioned that a database administrator
(or an ADP device) would insert data using the technique outlined in Section V by
creating a separate record for each classification category. In our sample database,
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information about the Soviet Su-27 Flanker resides in four records (30 through 33). One
record is TOP SECRET and contains a codeword 1, another is TOP SECRET and does
not contain codeword 1 material, one is SECRET with codeword 1 and the last is
SECRET without codeword 1.
It is possible that originally the data from all four records were present
together in a single message classified at the highest classification (TOP SECRET with
codeword). In order to satisfy multi-level security requirements, the database
administrator (or an ADP device) divided the text of the message into four pieces based
upon the security requirements of each part.
When the proposed security method is implemented, the individuals with
a TOP SECRET codword 1 access will see all four records if they have queried the
database specifying the necessary directory attributes—just as if they were reading the
original message. However, a user with TOP SECRET but no codeword access would
only see records 31 through 33.
2. Some observations
You will note that there are 33 records distributed among 17 clusters. One
of the design concerns with ABDM and the security methodology is how to devise a
DDIT that will maximize clustering in order to keep the size of the CDTs relatively small
and still satisfy access precision requirements.
In the security part of the thesis I have not discussed non-directory
attributes. In an actual implementation, non-directory keywords can play an important
role. For example, in this database we may want to add a capability to further specify that
we want only fighter aircraft with "look-down shoot-down" capabilities, but that because
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of the reorganization necessary in the meta-data we want this to be a non-directory
keyword.
In this case, ABDM will use the meta data without change; however, the
database may bring in records that do no satisfy the non-directory keyword requirements.
The check to determine whether the record does meet the requirements is done in the
primary memory. Therefore we have less than absolute precision.
The issue of record-to-clustering ratios will have to be analyzed for every
implementation and will require data analysis by the database administrator.
In the case of the example given, analysis was done a priori of the
development of DDIT~of particular concern are type A attributes, the range attributes,
since by choosing the ranges well a database administrator can maximize clustering and
thus maximize the efficiency of searching the meta-data files.
Combat radius ranges were examined as given in "Jane's All the Worlds
Aircraft" for the fighter aircraft from the countries to be used in the sample database
(COUNTRY a directory attribute). It was evident that for Soviet fighters there was a
definite group with a combat radius between roughly 400 and 600 nautical miles and
another group between 600 and 800. As a result, C8, C12 and C16 all fit the descriptor
requirements for four records. More American fighters in the 600 to 800 radius ranges
could have also been included but were not in order to keep Appendix A reasonably
short.
In summary, the type A attributes of ABDM are invaluable in designing a
database to maximize meta-data (directory) look up. Such consideration is extremely
important to a secure database since the partitioning is finer than in a normal database
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and the size of the CDT will tend to be much larger because of the requirement for a
separate CDT for every security attribute combination.
C. A SAMPLE RETRIEVE OPERATION
Assume the user logs on to the system and is identified as having access to
SECRET with codewordl material (it is implied the user has access to classifications
equal-to and below this level).
The user then types in:
RETRTEVE((FILE = Aircraft) and (350 < RADIUS < 601) and
(COUNTRY = U.S.S.R.) and (PLANE-Type = Fighter).
Steps 1 and 2 of the execution steps described in Chapter IV are unchanged: The
query is processed against AT and the directory attributes are processed against DDIT.




At Step 3, the system then brings into the main memory only those CDTs this
user is cleared for. We will ignore implementation issues such as the fact that in actual
implementations all the tables would probably not be brought into the main memory at
the same time. For this example, these are tables (refer to Figure 6.1) (e),(f),(g),(h) and
(i). CDTs (a),(b), (c), and (d) are never brought into the main memory.
Step 3, the cluster determination step, then proceeds normally as in ABDM.
Using the descriptor-id groups we search the CDTs for a corresponding descriptor-id set
(cluster). In this case, we match with C12 and C16. Note there would be a match with
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C5 and C8 if the user had access to TOP SECRET with codewordl material. However,
the CDTs giving the address to these records is never searched.
An optional security check is to confirm the user's security access is greater-than
or equal to the security attributes specified in the CDTs.
Step 4, determining the record ids and addresses, is unchanged.
Step 5, selection of the database records, is also unchanged except, again, there is
an option of checking the security attributes contained in the record in the main memory
to again ensure the user is properly cleared. Note that it is also at this point that even if
only directory attributes are used, we can not be assured of absolute precision with
ABDM. If the query had asked for all Soviet fighter aircraft with combat radii between
415 and 601, the same clusters would have been selected and the records brought into the
main memory. However, records 28 and 29 would not be given to the user because the
combat radius of the Fishbed is 410. The security requirements are not affected by this
lack of precision.
Step 6, processing the database records, is unchanged.
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vn. CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION
This thesis has outlined a multilevel security mechanism that is conceptually both
efficient and secure. It is efficient because it can operate with close to absolute precision
and not pass through unwanted data. A critical point is that the method is secure for the
very same reasons it is efficient.
The approach outlined is an integrated database system approach. Both the
meta-data and base-data are organized and controlled to support partitioning of the data
into disjoint sets of records (equivalence classes). ABDM supports this system approach.
The base-data are partitioned into sets of records called clusters, each of which
has the same set of directory attribute descriptors. The security methodology has further
specified that each cluster have the same set of security attribute descriptors. The security
attributes are treated in much the same manner as directory attributes are.
The security methodology partitions the meta-data also. This is accomplished by
using separate CDTs, one for each different aggregate of security attribute descriptors.
CDTs are referenced in accordance with the user's access rights. This construction
supports precision and efficiency objectives at the meta-data level in the same way it is
supported for the base-data. Only those CDTs which address records the user is cleared
for are brought into the main memory for processing.
At this conceptual level, this method appears superior to both the query
modification and the view mechanism. Query modification requires a system overhead in
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query processing not incurred by this model, and the view mechanism still suffers from
the pass-through problem, thereby losing efficiency and providing a potential for security
compromise in case of hardware failure.
B. REMAINING ISSUES AND FUTURE WORK
Two primary areas of work remain: a formal proof that the implementation of this
methodology is secure; and the actual implementation of the conceptual model. A proof
would entail construction of a formal semantic model of ABDM and the additions
proposed in this paper. At later stages of development, the actual implementation design
would have to be incorporated into this proof to evaluate its sufficiency. This area will
not be discussed further.
There are fundamentally two categories of implementation depending on
motivation: implementation which modifies ABDM in order to benchmark efficiency and
serve as a medium for further research; and the second, which is a secure implementation
and would be convergent with the formal proof already mentioned.
The former, implementation without concern of proof, is a matter of ABDM
system level modification in at least the following areas:
1. Support of multiple CDTs;
2. Addition of system level look-up tables to address CDTs;
3. Modification of CDT to incorporate entry of security attribute
value for each security attribute used by the system;
4. System check of password that provides associated access levels
that can be equated to CDT address table entries (2 above);
5. Additional check of security values in descriptor id set upon
match with cluster, and additional check of security attribute
values in record upon retrieval (optional);
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6. Modification of ABDM's three interactive dialogues used in the
creation of a new database. Decisions will have to be made as to
whether security attributes are entered into the templates (first
dialogue) and modifications made to ensure the system treats these
differently from non-security attributes (e.g., they do not appear
in AT or DDIT tables). In the second dialogue, the descriptors for
the security attributes will have to defined and protected. In the
third dialogue, creation of multiple records will have to be controlled
so that Rule 1 of Chapter V is enforced, i.e., that every record
in the database must contain all the security attributes used by the
system and a value for each attribute.
7. ABDM will have to be modified to incorporate security decisions
concerning update of the security attribute values in records.
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APPENDIX A - THE SAMPLE DATABASE
Most data extracted from "JANE'S ALL THE WORLDS AIRCRAFT"
(Some data are fabricated for the purpose of making the example)
ALL SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS ARE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY
1. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATON, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, Y >,
(Text: The McDonnel Douglas F-15C Eagle are based in...targeting...})
2. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATON, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, N >,
{Text:...})
3. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATION, S >, < CODEWORD1, Y >,
{Text:...})
4.( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATION, S >, < CODEWORD 1, N >,
{Text:...})
5. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATION, C >, < CODEWORD1, N >, {
Text:...})
6. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATION, C >, < CODEWORD1, Y >, {
Text:...})
7. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 800 >, < CLASSIFICATION, U >, < CODEWORD1, N >, {
Text:...})
8. ( < FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 575 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD1, Y >, {
Text: The McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A Hornet...})
9. Same as Record 8 with CLASSIFICATION TS and no codewordl (in
actual implementation text would be different).
10. Same as Record 8 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
11. Same as Record 8 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl.
12. Same as Record 8 with CLASSIFICATION C and no codewordl.
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13. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.A. >,
< RADIUS, 725 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, N >, {
Text: The Grumman F-14A Tomcat...})
14. Same as Record 13 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl.
15. Same as Record 13 with CLASSIFICATION C and no codewordl.
16. Same as Record 13 with CLASSIFICATION U and no codewordl.
17. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 610 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD1, Y >, {
Text: The MiG-25A Foxbat...})
18. Same as Record 17 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
19. Same as Record 17 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl.
20. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 810 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD1, Y >, {
Text: The MiG-31 Foxhound...})
21. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 430 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, N >, {
Text: The Mig-29 Fulcrum...})
22. Same as record 21 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
23. Same as record 21 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl
present.
24. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 475 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, N >, {
Text: The MiG-23 Flogger...})
25. Same as record 24 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
26. Same as record 24 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl
present.
27. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 410 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD1, N >, {
Text: The MiG-21 Fishbed...})
28. Same as record 27 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
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29. Same as record 27 with CLASSIFICATION S and no codewordl
present.
30. (< FILE, aircraft >, < PLANE-Type, fighter >, < COUNTRY, U.S.S.R.
>, < RADIUS, 595 >, < CLASSIFICATION, TS >, < CODEWORD 1, Y >, {
Text: The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker...})
31. Same as record 30 with CLASSIFICATION TS and no codewordl
present.
32. Same as record 30 with CLASSIFICATION S and codewordl present.
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